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Abstract
The evolution of leadership in migratory populations depends not only on costs
and benefits of leadership investments but also on the opportunities for indi-
viduals to rely on cues from others through social interactions. We derive an
analytically tractable adaptive dynamic network model of collective migration
with fast timescale migration dynamics and slow timescale adaptive dynamics
of individual leadership investment and social interaction. For large popula-
tions, our analysis of bifurcations with respect to investment cost explains the
observed hysteretic effect associated with recovery of migration in fragmented
environments. Further, we show a minimum connectivity threshold above which
there is evolutionary branching into leader and follower populations. For small
populations, we show how the topology of the underlying social interaction net-
work influences the emergence and location of leaders in the adaptive system.
Our model and analysis can describe other adaptive network dynamics involving
collective tracking or collective learning of a noisy, unknown signal, and likewise
can inform the design of robotic networks where agents use decentralized strate-
gies that balance direct environmental measurements with agent interactions.
Keywords: Evolutionary dynamics, Adaptive networks, Collective migration,
Leadership, Social networks
1. Introduction
A great variety of species including birds, fish, invertebrates and mammals
engage in collective migration [1, 2, 3, 4]. The migratory process is often an
adaptive response to conditions such as competition for resources in a dynamic
environment, seasonal variability, and selection of new habitats for breeding
[1, 5, 6, 7]. On the one hand, animals perform migratory tasks by leveraging en-
vironmental cues such as nutrient and thermal gradients, magnetic fields, odor
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cues, or visual markers [8, 9, 10]. Measuring these stochastic environmental
signals is complicated and requires the investment of time and energy, as well
as the development of necessary physiological and sensory machinery such as
vision in insects and vertebrates [2] and chemical signaling in bacteria [11]. On
the other hand, animals can perform migrating tasks by leveraging social cues
from neighbors (nearby conspecifics) [5, 6, 7]. By imitating invested neighbors
(or neighbors of invested neighbors, etc.) using consensus processes such as co-
hesion and alignment, some animals in a group can migrate well without paying
the costs associated with directly measuring and processing the environmental
signal.
The interplay between costly information acquisition from the environment
and relatively less expensive social interactions with the group raises two impor-
tant questions regarding leadership and social interactions in migratory popu-
lations. Here, leadership means the influence of individuals who are informed
about the environmental signal, e.g., by investing time and energy in taking a
measurement. Although these informed individuals are referred to as “leaders”
and the remaining uninformed individuals as “followers”, it is not assumed that
leaders can be identified or can signal their information to others.
The first important question relates to the migratory performance of large
groups in the presence of a limited number of leaders, i.e., can a subset of in-
formed individuals effectively lead a large group? Couzin et al. [12] address
this question using individual-based simulations (involving social forces of at-
traction, repulsion and alignment among individuals) and demonstrate that in
a group of socially interacting individuals, a small fraction of informed leaders
can effectively determine the direction of travel of a large group of uninformed
followers.
The second important question relates to the evolution of leadership in collec-
tive migration, i.e., under what conditions is the coexistence of invested leaders
and social followers stable in an evolutionarily sense? This question is espe-
cially relevant when the cost of investing in signal acquisition is sufficiently
high; followers can leverage the investments made by leaders using social in-
teractions without having to pay the investment costs themselves, but not all
individuals can be followers if the group is to migrate successfully. Guttal and
Couzin [5] address this question (also see related commentary [13]) using evolu-
tionary simulations and an individual-based model similar to that used in [12];
they show that the specialization of groups into coexisting leaders and followers
(also known as branching) is a stable evolutionary outcome.
Motivated by these questions and results, we develop an analytically tractable
model of collective migration with which we can rigorously study the adaptive
network dynamics associated with the evolution of collective migration and the
emergence of leadership when leadership is costly and social interaction is rela-
tively cheap. We investigate the influence on group-level outcomes of the (evolv-
ing) network topology, i.e., who is sensing and responding to whom within the
group, as a function of the cost of investing in the environmental signal. Our
model can be generalized to a broader set of adaptive network dynamics associ-
ated with a collective task, such as collective tracking or collective learning of a
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noisy, unknown signal [14, 15], carried out by agents with decentralized strate-
gies that balance direct environmental measurements with social interactions.
Torney et al. [6] derive a mean-field approximation to the evolutionary model
studied in [5], and using tools from evolutionary adaptive dynamics [16, 17] prove
conditions for the branching of a migrating population into leader and follower
groups. The mean-field approach effectively prescribes an all-to-all social in-
teraction topology between the individuals in order to reduce dimensionality,
critical to the analysis in [6]. However, the approach ignores the potentially
important role of limited social interactions; indeed, it has been shown that
network topology plays a critical role in determining outcomes in collective dy-
namics [14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21]. Our model derives directly from the model of [6]
with a key generalization to the case of limited interaction networks and a mod-
ification that allows individual fitnesses to be computed from a linear matrix
equation as a function of the network topology encoded by a directed graph.
In our model each agent i has a scalar strategy ki(t) ∈ [0, 1] at time t
which defines how much it invests in the environmental signal; ki = 0 means
no investment and ki = 1 means full investment. The strategy also determines
how much it attends to social interaction: a higher ki implies a lower attention
to measurements of neighbors, equivalently, the associated edges of the network
graph are scaled by (1 − ki)2. The network dynamics have two timescales. In
the fast timescale the strategies ki are fixed, such that the stochastic migration
dynamics and the fitnesses depend on a fixed interconnection topology. In the
slow timescale the strategies ki change according to evolutionary (or adaptive)
dynamics and with them the investments and graph edge weights.
We present three main results that leverage the extension of the migration
model of [6] to directed, limited social interaction topologies and the corre-
sponding matrix equation for fitnesses (which replaces extensive Monte-Carlo
simulations as used in [6, 5]). Our first main result is a complete bifurcation
analysis of the two-timescale dynamics as a function of investment cost in the
case of a large population with an underlying network topology that is all-to-
all; our results explain previous observations that are initial condition dependent
and demonstrate the hysteretic effect associated with losing and then recovering
migration ability as described in [5, 22]. Our second main result addresses the
two-timescale dynamics in the case of a large population with an underlying
network topology that is limited; we find a relatively small threshold in connec-
tivity above which there is evolutionary branching and emergence of leaders.
Our third main result addresses the case of a small population in which the
slow evolutionary dynamics of strategies ki, based on replication and mutation,
are replaced with individual greedy adaptive dynamics. We show the critical
role that the structure of the underlying network topology plays in determining
the location of leaders in the adaptive network and in influencing bifurcations in
the dynamics as a function of increasing cost. This analysis is motivated in part
by an interest in leveraging the mechanisms of evolved natural collectives in the
design of decentralized protocols for collective motion and decision-making in
robotic groups [18, 23].
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The paper is outlined as follows1. In Section 2 we present our evolutionary
migration model. We derive analytical results for fitnesses on the fast timescale
in Section 3. We study the slow timescale dynamics in the all-to-all limit in
Section 4 and for limited interconnections in Section 5. We focus on adaptive
dynamic nodes in small networks in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2. Model description
Our model is derived from the mean-field migration model in [6] with two key
modifications; we explicitly account for a limited social interaction graph topol-
ogy in the dynamics and we introduce a slightly modified social noise model to
allow for analytical fitness computations as a function of graph topology and in-
dividual investments. In the remainder of the paper we will refer to individuals,
agents and nodes interchangeably, and likewise population and network.
Consider a set of N agents indexed by i ∈ {1, · · · , N}. Let xi(t) ∈ R be
the direction of migration of agent i at time t, and let µ ∈ R be the “true”
desirable direction of migration. Accurate tracking of the direction µ over time
may correspond to benefits such as improvement in environmental conditions
for foraging, predator evasion, early access to breeding grounds, etc. Following
[6], the stochastic dynamics of each agent are given by
dxi = kidxDi + (1− ki)dxSi, (1)
where dxDi and dxSi are the driven tracking and social consensus stochastic
processes, respectively. The adaptive strategy ki ∈ [0, 1] tunes the level of in-
vestment made by agent i in the driven and social processes. When ki = 1,
agent i is fully invested in the tracking process and ignores social cues, while
when ki = 0 agent i exclusively leverages social cues without tracking the envi-
ronmental signal.
The driven process dxDi is modeled as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic
process [25, 26] of the form
dxDi = −kDi(xi − µ)dt+ σDdWDi. (2)
The parameter kDi ≥ 0 corresponds to the gain associated with tracking, σ2D > 0
is the noise intensity associated with measuring the environmental signal µ, and
dWDi represents the standard Wiener increment. For kDi > 0, the process (2)
has a steady-state mean and variance given by
lim
t→∞E [xi] = µ, limt→∞E
[
(xi − µ)2
]
=
σ2D
2kDi
. (3)
Higher values of tracking gain kDi result in lower steady-state variance in mi-
gration direction xi, which corresponds to improved tracking.
1See [24] for related text and figures.
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The social consensus process dxSi is modeled using basic tools from graph
theory [27, 28, 29]. Individuals are modeled as nodes on a directed social
interconnection graph with underlying structure defined by adjacency matrix
A = [aij ] ∈ RN×N . A directed edge in the graph from individual i to individual
j is read as “i can sense j”. Let Ni denote the set of neighbors of individual
i (i.e., the set of agents that individual i can sense), and let ‖Ni‖ denote the
cardinality of this set (number of neighbors that individual i can sense). The
adjacency matrix A is given by
aij =
{
‖Ni‖+ if j ∈ Ni
0 otherwise,
(4)
where ‖Ni‖+ is the pseudoinverse of ‖Ni‖ (‖Ni‖+ = 0 when ‖Ni‖ = 0, ‖Ni‖+ =
1/‖Ni‖ otherwise). The Laplacian matrix of the graph corresponding to A is
given by L = diag(A1)−A, where 1 is a vector of ones of appropriate dimension.
The social consensus process dxSi depends on the underlying social interac-
tion graph Laplacian L, the gain associated with the social process kSi ≥ 0, and
the noise associated with measuring the social signal σSi > 0 as follows:
dxSi = −kSiLixdt+ σSidWSi, (5)
where dWSi is the standard Wiener increment, Li denotes the i
th row of L
and x is the vector of the xi. In the social consensus process the graph that
represents the social interactions is the underlying graph modified such that all
edges from agent i are weighted by gain kSi, i = 1, . . . , N . Then kSiLix =
kSi‖Ni‖+
∑
j∈Ni(xi − xj).
Following the setup in [6], we make a simplification to reduce the parameter
space to one dimension by assuming that the gains are proportional to the
relative investments in each process, i.e., kDi = ki and kSi = 1−ki. Substituting
into (2) and (5) and then into (1) we have
dxi = kidxDi + (1− ki)dxSi
= −k2i (xi − µ)dt− (1− ki)2Lixdt+
√
k2i σ
2
D + (1− ki)2σ2Si dWi,
(6)
where dWi is the standard Wiener increment. Define the coordinate transfor-
mation x˜i as
x˜i =
xi − µ
σD
, and correspondingly x˜ =
x− µ1
σD
. (7)
Substituting (7) in (6) and using Li1 = 0 we have the normalized dynamics
dx˜i = −k2i x˜idt− (1− ki)2Lix˜dt+
√
k2i + (1− ki)2
σ2Si
σ2D
dWi. (8)
The social noise term σSi reflects the difficulty that agents have in extract-
ing social cues from interactions with neighbors. In [6], it is assumed that this
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difficulty (magnitude of σSi) decreases as the ordering or coherence of the pop-
ulation increases. Here we take a slightly different local (and graph dependent)
approach and relate the social noise term for an agent to the average investment
of the neighbors of that agent as
σ2Si
σ2D
= β2(1− knbhd,i), (9)
where
knbhd,i = ‖Ni‖+
∑
j∈Ni
ki
and β2 is a social noise scaling parameter. In vector form, knbhd = Ak, k =
(k1, . . . , kN )
T . In this model agents that interact socially with neighbors having
a high level of investment, have a correspondingly lower social noise term, and
are hence better able to extract social cues from their neighbors.
The stochastic system (8) can be written compactly in matrix form as
dx˜ = −(K1 +K2L)x˜ dt+ SdW , (10)
where the diagonal matrices K1, K2 and S are given by K1 = diag(k
2
i ), K2 =
diag
(
(1− ki)2
)
and S = diag
(√
k2i + β
2(1− ki)2(1− knbhd,i)
)
.
As discussed in [5, 6], the long-term migratory performance of agent i with
dynamics (10) can be computed as exp
(−σ2ss,i
2
)
, where σ2ss,i = lim
t→∞E
[
(xi − µ)2
]
is the steady-state variance of xi. For an agent i that moves at a constant mean
speed in the direction xi, this performance measure corresponds to the expected
migration speed of the agent in the desired direction µ. The fitness or utility of
agent i is defined in [5, 6] as
Fi = exp
(
−σ2ss,i
2
)
exp
(−ck2i ) , (11)
where the second exponential models the cost associated with investment in
tracking, and c > 0 is a scaling cost parameter. The form of cost function is
chosen for analytical tractability. Simulations in [6, 5] show that reasonable
variations of the fitness function (11) yield qualitatively comparable results.
The saturating form of the performance function exp
(−σ2ss,i
2
)
as a function
of investment can be interpreted as modeling the diminishing returns of increas-
ing investment. Further, the quadratic form of the cost ck2i implies that higher
investments in the driven process are increasingly costly. The optimal strategy
for solitary migrating individuals can be found by maximizing (11) with respect
to kDi after substituting for σ
2
ss,i =
σ2D
2kDi
from (3). This results in
kD,opt =
3
√
σ2D
8c
. (12)
While disconnected individuals may adopt the optimal strategy (12), the pres-
ence of social interactions between individuals leads to very different strategies.
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3. Fast timescale analysis
In this section we study the stochastic migration dynamics (10) and derive
analytical tools to compute migratory performance as a function of the underly-
ing network graph Laplacian L and agent investments ki. These tools are used
to compute fast timescale fitness (utility) in slow evolutionary (adaptive) dy-
namics in the sections that follow. This includes Section 4, where the population
is large and the underlying network topology is all-to-all, but most particularly
Section 5, where the population is large and the underlying network topology
is limited, and Section 6 where the population is small.
It is straightforward to show that if ki > 0 for all i then the population
can migrate for any network topology; likewise, if the population can migrate
then it is necessary that ki > 0 for at least one agent i [24]. If the network
has a spanning tree and ki > 0 for the root node of the spanning tree then the
population can migrate [30]. In Theorem 1 we prove conditions on L and k that
are necessary and sufficient for asymptotic stability of the zero equilibrium of
the dynamics (10) without noise:
˙˜x = M x˜, where M = −(K1 +K2L). (13)
The asymptotic stability of (13) corresponds to the population developing the
ability to collectively migrate since x˜→ 0 =⇒ x→ µ1. In Theorem 2 we prove
that asymptotic stability of (13) is necessary and sufficient for there to exist
a steady-state probability distribution of x˜ for the stochastic dynamics (10),
and we show that the steady-state covariance matrix, and thus the individual
fitnesses, can be computed from a Lyapunov equation that depends on L and
k. The dynamics (13) are asymptotically stable if and only if M is Hurwitz,
i.e., all eigenvalues of M have strictly negative real part.
The proof of Theorem 1 requires the following lemma from [31] (see also
[27, 32]). We first make the following definition.
Definition 1. A directed graph has a directed spanning tree if there exists at
least one node k on the graph such that a directed path exists from every other
node on the graph to node k. Node k is known as a root node of the graph.
Lemma 1. For a general Laplacian matrix L˜ = [l˜ij ] ∈ RN×N given by l˜ij ≤ 0
for i 6= j and
N∑
j=1
l˜ij = 0 for all i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, the following conditions are
equivalent:
(i) L˜ has a simple zero eigenvalue and all of the other eigenvalues have posi-
tive real parts.
(ii) The directed graph G(L˜) has a directed spanning tree, where G(L˜) is the
graph with adjacency matrix A˜ = [a˜ij ], a˜ii = 0 for all i, and a˜ij = −l˜ij
for all i 6= j.
(iii) For z ∈ RN , the dynamics z˙ = −L˜z converge asymptotically to α1 for
some scalar α.
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Proof. See Lemma 3.1 in [31], Theorem 2 in [27], and Lemma 2 in [32].
For undirected connected graphs, every node is a root node. For general
(connected or disconnected) directed graphs, one can define a root set that is
accessible from every other node in the network, i.e., there is a directed path
from every node to at least one node in the root set. Let R(L˜) denote a minimal
root set (set with smallest cardinality) of the graph G(L˜) with Laplacian L˜. The
set R(L˜) is not necessarily unique as is illustrated in Figure 1. For example, for
an undirected connected graph, R(L˜) = {i} for any node i.
Figure 1: Illustrations of the root setR(L) and the conditions of Theorem 1. In each graph, the
set of nodes labeled 1, · · · , N and solid arrows correspond to the underlying social graph G(L).
The complete set of nodes labeled 0, 1, · · · , N and all the arrows correspond to the augmented
graph G(Lˆ), where node 0 represents the external signal. All three augmented graphs shown
have a spanning tree rooted at node 0, and hence satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1. (a)
R(L) = {i} , any i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. (b) R(L) = {3}. (c) R(L) = {2, 3, 6} or {2, 3, 7}.
Theorem 1. Matrix M from (13) is Hurwitz if and only if there exists a min-
imal root set R(L) such that kj > 0 for all nodes j ∈ R(L), where L is the
Laplacian matrix of the underlying social graph with adjacency matrix (4).
Proof. Define the normalized external signal state x˜0 = 0 (equivalent to x0 = µ)
and the augmented state vector z = [x˜0 x˜]
T
. Consider the dynamics
z˙ =
[
˙˜x0
˙˜x
]
= −
[
0 0N×1
−K11 −M
] [
x˜0
x˜
]
= −Lˆz. (14)
Then Lˆ satisfies the properties of general Laplacian matrices given in Lemma
1. G(Lˆ) is the same as the graph G(K2L) with the addition of the node 0 (with
state x˜0) having incoming links with weights k
2
j from all nodes j = 1, · · · , N
(see Figure 1 for an illustration where links to node 0 with kj > 0 are shown as
dashed arrows).
Since node 0 of G(Lˆ) has no outgoing links, following Definition 1 we have
the following condition,
G(Lˆ) has a spanning tree ⇐⇒ R(Lˆ) = {0} . (15)
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We claim the following
G(Lˆ) has a spanning tree =⇒ ∃ R(L) s.t. kj > 0 for all j ∈ R(L). (16)
We prove the statement above by contradiction. Assume that G(Lˆ) has a span-
ning tree and for each root set R(L), there exists a node j such that kj = 0.
Since G(Lˆ) has a spanning tree, R(Lˆ) = {0}, which means that there is a di-
rected path from every node to node 0. Now consider any root set R(L). Since
kj = 0, node j in R(L) can only reach node 0 by a path to a node m /∈ R(L),
for which km > 0. However, if such a path exists, then the set R(L) where node
j is replaced with node m is another root set. By assumption we must have
km = 0. Thus there exists no directed path from node j to node 0. Hence G(Lˆ)
does not have a spanning tree and we have proved the claim.
Consider any root set R(L) and assume that kj > 0 for all j ∈ R(L). Then
all nodes j ∈ R(L) are connected to node 0 of G(Lˆ). For all nodes m /∈ R(L),
either km > 0 and m has a direct link to node 0, or km = 0 in which case m has
a link to at least one other node on a directed path to the root node 0, via an
element of R(L). Hence
∃ R(L) s.t. kj > 0 for all j ∈ R(L) =⇒ G(Lˆ) has a spanning tree . (17)
Combining (15), (16) and (17), we have that
∃ R(L) s.t. kj > 0 for all j ∈ R(L) ⇐⇒ G(Lˆ) has a spanning tree
⇐⇒ R(Lˆ) = {0} . (18)
From Lemma 1, G(Lˆ) has a spanning tree if and only if the dynamics (14)
converge asymptotically to α1 for some scalar α. However in (14), the state
x˜0 = 0 is invariant and hence α = 0. Thus,
G(Lˆ) has a spanning tree ⇐⇒ M is Hurwitz. (19)
Combining (18) and (19) we have the desired result.
Each of the graphs illustrated in Figure 1 satisfies the conditions of Theo-
rem 1 since kj > 0 for all j in at least one root set of R(L) (dashed arrows).
We now return to the noisy migration model given by the system of stochastic
equations (10). In order to compute the fitness of an individual in a migratory
collective as defined by (11), a computation of the steady-state variance of the
individual’s dynamics σ2ss,i is necessary. This quantity in turn depends on the
level of investment of each of the individuals in the network (represented by
the vector k) and the topology of the underlying social interconnection graph
G(L). The variances are the diagonal elements of the steady-state covariance
matrix Σ for the dynamics (10), which can be computed by solving the matrix
Lyapunov equation defined in Theorem 2 (see also [19, 14] for related results on
the consensus and drift-diffusion models respectively).
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Theorem 2. For the stochastic dynamics (10) with social graph G(L), suppose
there exists an R(L) such that kj > 0 for all j ∈ R(L). Then the system
of stochastic differential equations (10) has steady-state mean lim
t→∞E [x˜(t)] = 0
and steady-state covariance matrix Σ = lim
t→∞E
[
x˜(t)T x˜(t)
]
given by the solution
to the Lyapunov equation:
(K1 +K2L)Σ + Σ(K1 +K2L)
T = SST . (20)
Proof. The system (10) is a multivariate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with mean
given by [26]
E [x˜(t)] = exp (Mt)E [x˜(0)] .
By Theorem 1, M is Hurwitz and hence lim
t→∞E [x˜(t)] = 0.
The covariance matrix of x˜ is given by
E
[
(x˜(t)− E [x˜(t)])(x˜(t)− E [x˜(t)])T ]
= exp(Mt)E
[
x˜(0)x˜(0)T
]
exp(Mt) +
t∫
0
exp(M(t− s))SST exp(MT (t− s))ds.
Since M is Hurwitz, the steady-state covariance matrix is given by
Σ = lim
t→∞E
[
x˜(t)x˜(t)T
]
= lim
t→∞
t∫
0
exp(M(t− s))SST exp(MT (t− s))ds,
which as is shown in [26] is the solution to the Lyapunov equation:
MΣ + ΣMT + SST = 0.
We leverage the results of Theorem 2 to study the role of network topology
in the evolutionary dynamics of collective migration in Sections 4, 5, and 6.
We note that the theorem proves useful even in Section 4, where the underlying
network topology is all-to-all, because in the general case the different individual
investment strategies provide different edge weights in the social graph, making
for a directed network topology.
4. All-to-all case
4.1. Model specialized to the all-to-all case
As a first step in analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of the social migration
model (10) with fitness (11), we consider the limit of all-to-all interconnection
(aij =
1
N−1 for all i 6= j in (4)) in a large population (labeled the resident
population with subscript R), with all individuals having a common level of
investment kR > 0. This limit corresponds to the mean-field assumption used
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in [6]. By the law of large numbers, the average direction of population migration
in the limit of large N is the same as the desired migration direction µ after
the decay of transients (i.e., in steady-state, lim
N→∞
Lx = x− µ1). Substituting
Lx˜ = x˜ in (10), the dynamics of an individual in the population are given by
dx˜R = −
[
k2R + (1− kR)2
]
x˜R dt+
√
k2R + β
2(1− kR)3 dW. (21)
The corresponding steady-state variance of an individual’s direction is given
by
σ2ss,R =
k2R + β
2(1− kR)3
2 [k2R + (1− kR)2]
, (22)
with steady-state migration speed (performance) given by exp(−σ2ss,R/2). In
Figure 2 we plot this steady-state migration speed as a function of investment
kR for varying social noise term β. As defined in (9), the parameter β reflects
Figure 2: Steady-state migration speed as a function of resident population investment pa-
rameter kR and noise parameter β for a large population with all-to-all interconnection.
the strength of the noise from social interactions relative to the noise associated
with the tracking process. In Figure 2 we see that the migration performance
saturates at high levels of investment kR, and remains low over greater kR
ranges, for large β. We use β > 2 in this work to model noisier social inter-
actions relative to tracking (consistent with [6]); this provides an incentive for
individuals to invest in the tracking process.
4.2. Evolutionary adaptive dynamics
Now consider the evolution of strategies for such an all-to-all connected
population. A key part of any evolutionary algorithm is the computation of
fitness of individuals in the population as a function of strategy distribution,
model parameters, environmental conditions, and other such features. In certain
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cases (such as the all-to-all limit here), fitness can be analytically computed,
which allows for an explicit calculation of the outcomes of the evolutionary
process using tools from adaptive dynamics [16, 17, 33]. Adaptive dynamics are
well-suited for studying the evolution of a continuous one-dimensional trait in
a population undergoing small mutations.
Using (22) and (11), the fitness of an individual in the resident population
with dynamics (21) is given by
FR(kR) = exp
(
−k
2
R + β
2(1− kR)3
4(2k2R − 2kR + 1)
− ck2R
)
. (23)
Consider a small population of mutants with strategy kM interacting with each
other and with all the residents. The mutants (owing to their small numbers)
will experience the same social noise as the residents so their dynamics are
dx˜M = −
[
k2M + (1− kM )2
]
x˜M dt+
√
k2M + β
2(1− kR)(1− kM )2 dW. (24)
Correspondingly, the fitness of individuals in the mutant population is given by
FM (kR, kM ) = exp
(
−k
2
M + β
2(1− kR)(1− kM )2
4(2k2M − 2kM + 1)
− ck2M
)
. (25)
The relative fitness of the mutant strategy in the environment of the resident is
known as the differential fitness and is given by
S(kR, kM ) = FM (kR, kM )− FR(kR). (26)
For a given resident strategy kR, the values of kM that result in S > 0
correspond to the mutant strategies that when rare can invade the established
resident population. Further, a study of the selection landscape S can help
us predict conditions for an evolutionarily stable monomorphic population (all
individuals having the same strategy) and conditions for evolutionary branching
into subpopulations of leaders (ki ≈ 1) and followers (ki ≈ 0), as a function of
the cost c associated with strategy investment.
The evolutionary dynamics of the resident strategy kR are given by
dkR
dτ
= γ
∂S
∂kM
∣∣∣∣
kM=kR
=: γ g(kR), (27)
where g(kR) is the selection gradient and γ is a positive scalar constant. We
note that the timescale τ associated with (27) corresponds to slow evolutionary
time and is different from the fast timescale t associated with the stochastic
migrations dynamics (10) and (21). For the differential fitness S defined in
(26), (23) and (25), singular strategies k∗ corresponding to equilibria of (27)
(defined as g(k∗) = 0) are given by the solutions to the following equation
(details in Appendix A):
k∗
[
β2(1− k∗)− 1
]
(k∗ − 1) + 4ck∗(2k2∗ − 2k∗ + 1)2 = 0. (28)
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A singular strategy k∗ is known as a Convergent Stable Strategy (CSS) if it
is locally asymptotically stable for the dynamics (27), i.e., if
∂g
∂kR
∣∣∣∣
kR=k∗
< 0. (29)
A CSS strategy k∗ can be either locally evolutionary stable (local ESS) for the
population, or it can be a branching point for the population. The condition
for it to be a branching point is
∂2S
∂k2M
∣∣∣∣
kM=kR=k∗
> 0. (30)
For S defined in (26), the branching condition (30) evaluates to (details in
Appendix A)
0 < k∗ <
5−√7
6
≈ 0.3923. (31)
The branching condition (31) is exactly the same as that obtained in [6]. Param-
eters β and c of the dynamics that yield CSS singular strategies k∗ ∈
(
0, 5−
√
7
6
)
result in populations with distinct leader and follower groups via evolutionary
branching.
4.3. Results
The bifurcation diagram in Figure 3 summarizes the singular strategy con-
dition (28), CSS condition (29) and branching condition (31) to obtain four
distinct sets of evolutionary outcomes (in ranges A, B, C and D) for our model
for increasing cost parameter c (calculations in Appendix A):
(A) Monomorphic population: For 0 < c < β
2−1
4 there exists only one CSS
strategy, and it is evolutionarily stable (since k∗ > 5−
√
7
6 ), resulting in a
monomorphic population with strategy k∗. The other singular strategy
corresponding to the fully social strategy k∗ = 0 is not convergent stable.
(B) Two local CSS’s that are each evolutionarily stable: For β
2−1
4 < c < c1
there exist two convergent stable strategies, one of which is the fully social
strategy k∗ = 0. Both singular strategies are locally evolutionarily stable.
c1 is defined implicitly as the solution to the equation g(
5−√7
6 )
∣∣∣
c=c1
= 0.
(C) Branching: For c1 < c < c2 the convergent stable interior (k∗ ∈ (0, 1))
singular strategy satisfies the branching condition (31) resulting in the
population splitting into distinct leader and follower groups.
(D) Collapse of Migration: For the high cost scenario c > c2, the only singular
strategy that exists is the convergent stable fully social strategy k∗ = 0
and the population does not develop any migration ability.
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Figure 3: Evolutionary singular strategies k∗ as a function of cost parameter c. The two
sets of singular strategies defined by (28) are plotted in blue. One set corresponds to k∗ = 0
and the other corresponds to the curve given by the equation c =
(1−k∗)[β2(1−k∗)−1]
4(2k2∗−2k∗+1)2
. Solid
curves are CSS strategies, and dashed curves are unstable singular strategies. The regions
marked (A)-(D) correspond to the descriptions in the text. Analytical derivations for the cost
parameters β
2−1
4
, c1 and c2 that divide the regions are given in Appendix A.
These four cases constitute a comprehensive picture of the evolutionary dy-
namics of the migration model (10) in the all-to-all limit, and encompass key
features of the branching calculations in [6] and evolutionary simulations in [5].
The existence of two locally evolutionary stable attractors in case (B) above
implies that the evolutionary dynamics can potentially yield two-strategy out-
comes in the population without evolutionary branching (case (C)).
A hysteretic effect associated with restoring population migration ability
once destroyed is apparent in Figure 3. In particular, once migration ability in
the population is lost for high cost parameter c > c2, the cost parameter needs
to be reduced below the level β
2−1
4 (i.e., below c1 < c2) for migration ability
to be regained. This compares to the simulations in [5, 22] where agent-based
models are used to study the effect of habitat fragmentation on the evolution of
migration (see also [7]). In these simulations, the authors study the impacts of
progressively more fragmented habitats on migratory outcomes, and show that
once migration ability is lost for a threshold level of fragmentation, much greater
habitat recovery is necessary to restore lost migration ability (a hysteretic effect).
Higher levels of habitat fragmentation are comparable to higher cost c.
In Figure 4 we show the pairwise invasibility plots (PIPs) [16, 17, 33] of the
differential fitness S(kR, kM ) for increasing cost c to illustrate the four sets of
outcomes described above. These plots show the sign of S as a function of the
resident and mutant population strategies. Dark regions correspond to differ-
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Figure 4: Evolutionary dynamics for the migration model with all-to-all interconnection, noise
parameter β = 3, and with increasing cost parameter c from left to right: c = 1, 2.2, 2.6, 3.8.
The top row shows the pairwise invasibility plots for kM vs. kR, each from 0 to 1. Black regions
correspond to differential fitness S(kR, kM ) > 0 (mutants can invade) and white regions to
S < 0. The red vertical lines pass through convergent stable interior strategies kR = k∗. The
middle row of plots are evolutionary simulations starting with a monomorphic population
with strategy k = 0.5; hot colors correspond to high population density. The bottom row
of plots are also evolutionary simulations, but having an initial population with a uniformly
randomly distributed strategy k ∈ [0, 1]. We use N = 2000 individuals for these simulations.
The threshold costs as defined in Figure 3 for β = 3 are c1 = 2.48 and c2 = 2.77.
ential fitness S > 0 and allow mutant invasions; white regions correspond to
S < 0 and prohibit mutant invasions. The population resides on the diagonal,
and is monomorphic when a negative differential fitness is associated with the
red vertical line through the singular strategy k∗. The PIPs in Figure 4 show
conditions for an initially monomorphic population for low values of cost param-
eter c and population branching for intermediate values of c. For high values
of c we see conditions that prevent individuals from developing any significant
investment and therefore any significant migration ability.
We confirm our predictions from the adaptive dynamics analysis by running
evolutionary simulations in the case of a monomorphic initial condition and
also a uniformly randomly distributed initial condition as shown in Figure 4
(bottom two rows). These simulations comprise the roulette-wheel selection [34]
and small mutation operations on each generation of a population of N = 2000
individuals with all-to-all social graph, dynamics (10), and fitness (11). The
fitnesses are computed for each generation using equation (20) of Theorem 2.
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The columns in Figure 4 from left to right correspond to the cases (A)-(D)
respectively. In case (A), both initial conditions result in a monomorphic evo-
lutionary outcome. In case (B), the polymorphic solution for the evolutionary
simulation with random initial conditions (Column 2, last Row) is a consequence
of the stability of the k∗ = 0 singular strategy, and not a consequence of branch-
ing, as is the case in (C). Case (D) corresponds to the collapse of migration with
all individuals having an insignificant level of investment.
The analysis in this section shows the range of evolutionary outcomes for
the migration model with all-to-all social interconnection. We are particularly
motivated by conditions that result in the branching of the population into
invested leaders and social followers. In the following section we study the
role that limited social interconnection topology plays in the emergence of this
evolutionary branching.
5. Limited interconnections case
While the all-to-all topology assumption of Section 4 allows for a detailed
analysis of the evolutionary dynamics in a large population, it is unrealistic for
most biological and decentralized artificial systems. In this section, we relax
the all-to-all assumption and study the migration model (10) with underlying
limited interconnection.
The Lyapunov equation (20) in Theorem 2 allows us to compute (without
simulation) the migratory performance (and correspondingly fitness (11)) of
individuals since the diagonal terms of the steady-state covariance matrix Σ are
the individual steady-state variances σ2ss,i. In this section, we use evolutionary
simulations based on fast timescale fitness calculations from (20) to study the
role that graph connectivity plays in the evolution of branching.
We focus on three classes of social graph topologies of which one is ordered
(ring lattice) and two are random (undirected and directed). In each class,
a single parameter controls the level of connectivity of the graph. The three
classes of graphs used are listed below:
• Undirected Ring Lattice: A graph with N nodes, each connected to K
nearest neighbors, K/2 on each side, for K even. An undirected edge exists
between nodes i and j if and only if 0 < min {|i− j|, N − |i− j|} ≤ K/2.
The graph is connected for K ≥ 2.
• Random Undirected (Erdo˝s-Re´nyi) [35, 36]: Undirected graph with N
nodes. Every edge in the graph exists randomly with a uniform probability
p. The expected number of neighbors of a node is E[K] = Np for large
N . The graph is almost surely connected if p > ln(N)/N or equivalently
E[K] > ln(N).
• Random Directed [37, 38]: Directed graph with N nodes. Each node has a
probability p of having a directed link to every other node in the network.
The expected number of neighbors of a node is E[K] = Np for large N .
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Figure 5: Effect of number of neighbors K on the evolutionary outcomes of the migration
model. The left plot shows the equilibrium strategy distribution as a function of number of
nearest neighbors for the ring lattice graph model with N = 400 nodes and parameters β = 3
and c = 2.6; bright colors correspond to higher population density. The two plots on the right
labeled (a) and (b) are evolutionary simulations, the steady-state conditions in these plots
correspond to the red dashed slices in the left plot. The two-strategy equilibrium exists only
once the graph connectivity exceeds a threshold number of neighbors (K ≈ 15 for parameters
chosen here).
For each class of topologies, the parameters K and p allow us to explore
a range of connectivities; for K = p = 0, the social graphs are fully discon-
nected and individuals must resort to solitary migration with a monomorphic
optimal strategy (12). For K → N − 1 (for the ring lattice) and p → 1 (for
the random graphs), the social graph is fully connected, resulting in the leader
and follower evolutionary equilibrium for certain parameter choices as discussed
in Section 4. Between these two connectivity extremes, intuition suggests that
an intermediate level of limited connectivity can provide adequate information
flow in the network for followers to leverage the investments made by leaders,
thereby resulting in the two distinct populations. In Figures 5 and 6 we confirm
this intuition by showing that the transition from a monomorphic solution, to a
branched evolutionary solution as a function of topology (parameterized by K
and p), occurs at an intermediate threshold level of connectivity.
For the simulation in Figure 5 we use the ring lattice topology for the social
graph with N = 400 individuals and choose a set of parameters for which the all-
to-all social graph is known to have a two-strategy solution, β = 3 and c = 2.6
(see Figure 4, column 3). For a range of values of the number of neighbors
K = 2, 4, · · · , 100, we compute the fitness of individuals using (20) and (11)
and evolve the strategies of the populations to an evolutionary steady state.
This steady-state strategy distribution is plotted as a function of number of
neighbors K in Figure 5. We see that there exists an intermediate threshold
for social connectivity (given by K ≈ 15) that allows for adequate information
flow in the network to result in evolutionary branching. That is, social graphs
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that are much sparser (fewer edges) than the all-to-all case analyzed in Section
4 can yield leader and follower evolutionary outcomes.
In Figure 6 we present simulations similar to those described for Figure 5
above, for all three classes of social graph topologies (ring lattice, undirected
random, directed random) and for N = 200, 400, 600. In each case, we see a
minimum connectivity threshold for evolutionary branching that is higher than
the minimum threshold for the social graph to be connected. We also see that
this threshold for branching is not affected by increasing population size N in
the range of N considered; i.e., the minimum fraction of the population that
each node must be connected to for branching decreases with population size.
Further, the location of the threshold is dependent on the class of graph being
considered; the two classes of random graphs have lower thresholds than the
ordered ring lattice.
Ring Lattice Random Undirected Random Directed
N=200
N=400
N=600
N=200
N=400
N=600
N=200
N=400
N=600
Figure 6: Evolutionary equilibria as a function of social graph topology for ring lattice, random
undirected and random directed graph models with parameters β = 3 and c = 2.6; number
of nodes N are shown on each plot. The minimum number of neighbors (or mean number for
the random graphs) is independent of the number of nodes N in these plots, ≈ 15 for the ring
lattice, ≈ 9 for the random undirected graphs and ≈ 8 for the random directed graphs.
The simulations in this section illustrate the significant effect of limited social
graph connectivity on the evolution of branching in migration. In particular
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we show that social connectivity above threshold levels can yield two-strategy
outcomes (leaders and followers) in the evolutionary dynamics. The thresholds
depend on the classes of social graph topology being considered. Determining
the analytical minimum connectivity threshold as a function of parameters β,
c and class of graph, is a topic of interest. A natural next step is to look
at other classes of graph topologies such as spatially embedded graphs with a
topological metric on connectivity (such as in [20]), and classes of small-world
graphs parameterized by a single rewiring parameter [39, 36]. The ring lattice
and undirected random graphs considered here are two extreme limits of the
Watts-Strogatz [39] small world connectivity model.
6. Adaptive nodes
Our analysis of the collective migration model (10) thus far has focused on
the evolutionary perspective, considering the dynamics of networks with large
numbers of nodes. As discussed in Section 1, the stochastic dynamics (10) can be
interpreted more generally as collective tracking or learning dynamics in multi-
agent systems of small or large size. In this section we shift focus and consider
the model (10) from an adaptive perspective on small dynamic networks. This
analysis is motivated in part by questions about leadership, task assignment,
learning and robust adaptive behavior in multi-agent robotic systems.
We consider a simple model of greedy local optimization by nodes on a graph,
which yields individual adaptation of investments ki. For this model we show
bifurcations as a function of cost that yield leader-follower emergent behavior as
equilibria of the adaptive process. We also illustrate the critical role played by
graph topology in determining the location of leaders in the network of adaptive
nodes using several examples.
Consider a system of interconnected agents with fast timescale tracking dy-
namics given by (10). Further, suppose that each agent seeks to maximize its
local utility function by adapting its investment parameter ki. We assume that
the utility function for each agent Ui is given by the fitness function (11),
Ui = exp
(
−σ2ss,i
2
)
exp
(−ck2i ) . (32)
In this setting, the utility function for a focal agent i depends on the agent’s
investment ki, as well as the investments of other nodes in the network; we
assume that an agent can measure its own utility, but not the investments of
other agents. Each agent modifies its investments ki on a slow timescale by
climbing the gradient of its local utility Ui to reach its local maximum,
k˙i =
dki
dt
=
∂Ui
∂ki
, i = {1, · · · , N} . (33)
Our goal is to study the outcomes of this adaptive process by computing equi-
libria of the dynamics defined by (33), (32) and (10), and studying their bifur-
cations.
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6.1. N = 2 case
We first look at the simplest case of the dynamics with N = 2 nodes, with
an underlying all-to-all graph. In this case, the steady-state covariance matrix
Σ (from (20)) can be computed analytically [26] as
Σ =
(Det M)SST + [−M + (Tr M)]SST [−M + (Tr M)]T
−2(Det M)(Tr M) , (34)
where matrices M and S are defined in (10) and (13). For each pair {i, j} =
{1, 2}, {2, 1}, the diagonal elements of Σ from (34) are given by
σ2ss,i =
fij (ki − 1) 4 + fji
(
2k2j − 2kj + 1
)
2 + fjigij
4gij
(
k2i + k
2
j − ki − kj + 1
) , (35)
where fij =
(
k2j − β2 (ki − 1) (kj − 1) 2
)
,
and gij =
(
3k2j − 2kj + 1
)
k2i − 2k2jki + k2j .
Substituting (35) in (33) and (32), we compute the equilibria keq of the
dynamics (33) and (10) and their stability as a function of increasing cost
parameter c. Analytical expressions of the equilibria are complicated; we il-
lustrate the equilibria for β = 3 in Figure 7. For low cost, both individuals
make a significant equal investment corresponding to the symmetric equilibrium
keq,1 = keq,2  0. As cost increases, the level of this equilibrium investment de-
creases and eventually a pair of stable leader-follower equilibria appear via two
saddle-node bifurcations. At this cost level, it is quite interesting to note that
both the symmetric solution (monomorphic population) and the two-strategy
solution (branching populations) coexist as stable solutions. However, as the
cost increases further, the symmetric stable equilibrium loses stability in a sub-
critical pitchfork bifurcation, leaving the leader-follower pair of stable equilibria
and an unstable symmetric saddle equilibrium. A phase portrait for the slow
timescale dynamics (strategies k1 and k2) is shown in Figure 7 for each of three
values of cost c to illustrate the different sets of equilibrium solutions.
6.2. N > 2 all-to-all
For larger networks with underlying all-to-all graph and dynamics (33) and
(10), bifurcations in cost c yield generalizations of the bifurcations observed in
the N = 2 case. Figure 8 illustrates these bifurcations in the case of N = 10.
The plot on the left shows the equilibrium values of the strategies ki as a function
of c. For a given value of c there are multiple co-existing stable leader-follower
solutions, each solution differing by the number of leaders (and therefore the
number of followers). For example, at c = 10 there are distinct stable solutions
with 3, 4, 5 and 6 leaders; the adaptation of ki as a function of time is shown
to the right at the bottom (marked by a triangle) for initial conditions that
yields 4 leaders and 6 followers. Other examples are shown in the case c = 1
and c = 3. It can be observed from Figure 8 that the fraction of nodes in the
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c
k1 k1 k1
k2 k2 k2
c = 15 c = 17.5 c = 20
c1 c2
keq,i
Figure 7: Bifurcations for the adaptive node dynamics (33) with N = 2 nodes, an underlying
all-to-all social graph, and noise parameter β = 3. The top plot shows the two components of
keq (equilibria of the dynamics (33) and (10)) as a function of the cost parameter c. Stable
sinks are marked blue and unstable saddles are marked red. The inset shows a zoomed in view
of the region with 15 ≤ c ≤ 20 marked in the dotted square. The dashed lines in the inset
c1 ≈ 16.7 and c2 ≈ 18.2 denote the saddle-node and pitchfork bifurcation points respectively.
The row of bottom plots are phase portraits for the slow timescale dynamics with parameter
c as indicated; the circles are stable sinks and the squares are saddles. These plots remain
qualitatively the same for different values of β > 2; the bifurcation points c1 and c2 move
further to the right for higher β.
leader populations decreases with increasing cost parameter c as a consequence
of several bifurcations in the dynamics.
We note that although the underlying social graph is undirected and all-to-
all, the adapted equilibrium solutions correspond to strongly directed graphs.
In particular, the edges in the graph from leaders to their neighbors have small
weights, whereas the edges from followers to their neighbors have large weights.
6.3. Star topology and other topologies
Above we show how the cost parameter c influences the number of leaders
and followers that emerge from the adaptive dynamics in the case of an under-
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N = 10, β = 3
Figure 8: Bifurcations for the adaptive node dynamics (33) and (10) with N = 10 nodes,
an underlying all-to-all social graph, and noise parameter β = 3. The left plot shows stable
equilibria of the dynamics as a function of c; plots of ki vs. time for the points marked with
the circle (c = 1), square (c = 3) and triangle (c = 10) are shown on the right. The labels
on the left plot indicate the number of leaders in each branch of stable solutions. It can be
observed that bifurcations yield fewer leaders for increasing cost.
lying all-to-all social graph. Here we study how the topology of limited social
interconnections influences the emergence and location of leaders and followers.
We illustrate this for a social graph defined by a star in Figure 9; the star graph
has a significant asymmetry since the central node can sense all N − 1 fringe
nodes, whereas the fringe nodes can each only sense the central node.
From the left plot in Figure 9, it can be seen that at low values of cost c, the
fringe nodes of the star invest strongly in the external signal as leaders while
the central node leverages these neighbors as a follower with small investment.
In this case, the fringe nodes pay almost no attention to social cues from the
central node while the central node relies almost exclusively on social cues from
the fringe nodes (an exploding star graph). At intermediate cost c, as shown in
the middle plot, all nodes make similar investments (monomorphic population).
At high cost c, as shown in the right plot, the central node adapts to become
the leader and ignores the fringe nodes, while all the fringe nodes leverage the
central node’s investment as followers (an imploding star graph).
We show equilibrium outcomes for three more underlying social graph topolo-
gies in Figure 10. For the undirected ring lattice shown on the left, and param-
eter values indicated, alternate nodes adapt to become leaders (red) while the
others become followers (blue). This is not surprising since an agent need not
invest if both of its immediate neighbors are heavily invested. For more com-
plicated topologies, the connection between topology and location of emergent
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c = 3 c = 5c = 0.1
Figure 9: Role of topology and cost parameter c for the adaptive node dynamics (33) and
(10) with N = 10, β = 3, and underlying social graph given by the star graph. In the star
graph, the central node can sense all the fringe nodes but the fringe nodes can each only
sense the central node. Each plot shows a simulation of the ten strategies ki versus time;
the parameter c is indicated on each plot and can be seen to increase from left to right. The
color-scale corresponds to the magnitude of equilibrium investment keq,i (higher values are
hotter colors); these colors are superimposed on the picture of the star graph for each of the
three simulations shown so that nodes with hotter colors can be observed to be the invested
leaders.
leaders is more challenging to interpret. Making the connection requires the de-
velopment of a graph and investment dependent metric to rank nodes for their
leadership potential, such as the information centrality metric used to rank cer-
tainty of nodes in networks of stochastic evidence accumulators [14].
Figure 10: Role of topology in determining locations of leaders on the social graph. Parameters
for all three plots are β = 3 and c = 4. The colors of nodes on each plot correspond to
equilibrium investments ki for the dynamics (33) and (10) with magnitudes indicated in the
color-bar. The left graph is an undirected star with N = 10 nodes. The two right plots show a
random spatial embedding of nodes with two different interconnection models. In the middle
plot, each node is connected to its three nearest neighbors (topological distance) and in the
right-most plot, each node is connected to all neighbors within a fixed radius given by the
dashed line drawn (metric distance).
7. Final remarks
The study of leadership in dynamic networks has received significant at-
tention in both biology and multi-agent robotics. In biology there has been
23
great interest in determining conditions for the stable evolution of leadership
in systems of socially interacting agents where there is incentive for individuals
to “free-ride” on the investment of others. In networked robotic systems, the
leader-follower paradigm has been studied in a variety of contexts as a tool to
design control protocols that achieve desired group performance.
In this work, we derive an analytically tractable adaptive dynamic network
model of collective migration in which investment (leadership) is costly and
social interactions are cheap, and we use this model to study the role of the social
interconnection graph in the evolution of leadership. We analyze bifurcations
in the dynamics as a function of the cost of investment by leveraging a two-
timescale dynamic with fast timescale migration dynamics and slow timescale
adaptation of investments and social graph edge weights. In the all-to-all limit of
the evolutionary model, our complete bifurcation analysis explains phenomena
such as the observed hysteretic effect associated with recovery of migration
in fragmented environments. In the general case of social interactions with
limited connectivity, we prove necessary and sufficient conditions on the graph
and investments such that the fitness of individuals in the stochastic migration
model can be computed from a Lyapunov equation. We use this solution to
show a minimum connectivity threshold in random and ordered networks above
which there is evolutionary branching into leader and follower populations.
Finally, we use our evolutionary collective migration model and fitness equa-
tion to study smaller networks inspired by collective robotic systems; we replace
the replication and mutation dynamics of the slow evolutionary timescale with
dynamics in which agents adapt their individual investment and social interac-
tion strategy according to a greedy optimization of their own utility function
(fitness). We study bifurcations in these dynamics as a function of investment
cost and show how the topology of the underlying network graph plays a crit-
ical role in determining the emergence and location of leaders in the adaptive
system.
Further work is needed to derive rigorous minimum bounds on connectivity
for branching of populations into leader and follower groups and generalization
of our nonlinear dynamics analysis of adaptive networks using formal graph
metrics. It is also of great interest to consider relaxing modeling assumptions
and generalizing the form of the dynamics. Another important avenue for future
work is to investigate where the top-down engineering design approach for group
performance meets the bottom-up adaptive approach taken in this paper, i.e.,
to explain how group performance emerges from the adaptive network dynamic
model and how we might leverage the bottom-up approach for design of high
performing and resilient network dynamics in collective tasks.
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Appendix A. Adaptive dynamics calculations
In this section we discuss the details of the adaptive dynamics analysis from
Section 4.2. Define the function
G(kR, kM ) =
k2M + (1− kM )2β2(1− kR)
4(2k2M − 2kM + 1)
+ ck2M .
Then the differential fitness from (26) is given by
S = exp[−G(kR, kM )]− exp[−G(kR, kR)].
The selection gradient g(kR) is given by
g(kR) =
∂S
∂kM
∣∣∣∣
kM=kR
= − exp[−G(kR, kR)]×(
kM (1− kM )[1 + β2(kR − 1)]
2(2k2M − 2kM + 1)2
+ 2ckM
)
.
Solving for the singular strategy condition g(k∗) = 0 gives the expression (28)
k∗(1− k∗)[1 + β2(k∗ − 1)] + 4ck∗(2k2∗ − 2k∗ + 1)2 = 0.
This expression has two sets of solutions that are plotted in Figure 3. One set
corresponds to k∗ = 0 and the other is defined implicitly by the equation
c =
(k∗ − 1)[1 + β2(k∗ − 1)]
4(2k2∗ − 2k∗ + 1)2
=: c˜(k∗). (A.1)
To determine conditions for evolutionary branching we compute
∂2S
∂k2M
∣∣∣∣
kM=kR=k∗
= − exp
[
−ck2∗ +
β2(k∗ − 1)3 − k2∗
4− 8k∗ + 8k2∗
]
×(
1 + β2(−1 + k∗)
)
k∗
(
3− 10k∗ + 6k2∗
)
2 (1− 2k∗ + 2k2∗)3
.
Hence the branching condition ∂
2S
∂k2M
∣∣∣
kM=kR=k∗
> 0 corresponds to
(
β2(1− k∗)− 1
)
k∗
(
3− 10k∗ + 6k2∗
)
2 (1− 2k∗ + 2k2∗)3
> 0. (A.2)
The zeros of the function above in the range k∗ ∈ [0, 1] are 0, 5−
√
7
6 , and 1− 1β2 .
A derivative test shows that the condition (A.2) is satisfied for k∗ ∈
(
0, 5−
√
7
6
)
.
The critical cost parameter c1 in Figure 3, corresponds to the maximum
singular value k∗ for branching and is given from (A.1) by c1 = c˜
(
5−√7
6
)
. The
parameter c2 is determined by calculating the local maximum of the function
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c˜(k∗) as seen in Figure 3. We use the notation c˜(kcrit) = c2. kcrit can be
calculated analytically and is given by a particular root of a cubic equation.
The analytical expression for kcrit (and correspondingly c2) is cumbersome and
hence is left out of this text. Nonetheless, the sketch in Figure 3 clearly conveys
the main ideas.
Finally we discuss the convergence stability of the singular strategies. The
convergence stability condition is given by (29). For the k∗ = 0 singular strategy,
∂g
∂kR
∣∣∣∣
kR=0
= exp
[−β2
4
]
β2 − 1− 4c
2
, hence
∂g
∂kR
∣∣∣∣
kR=0
< 0 ⇐⇒ c > β
2 − 1
4
.
For the second singular strategy curve defined implicitly by (A.1), the deriva-
tive term in the convergence stability condition evaluates to
∂g
∂kR
∣∣∣∣
kR=k∗
=
k∗
[−3 + 10k∗ − 6k2∗ − 2β2 (2k3∗ − 6k2∗ + 5k∗ − 1)] e−G(k∗,k∗)
2 (1− 2k∗ + 2k2∗)3
.
The interior root of ∂g∂kR
∣∣∣
kR=k∗
= 0 is precisely the value kcrit that maximizes
c˜(k∗) (since c = c˜(k∗) ≡ g(k∗) = 0); this root corresponds to c2 (see above).
Hence one can verify that the singular strategies corresponding to the curve
(A.1) are stable for k∗ > kcrit and unstable for k∗ < kcrit as shown in Figure 3.
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